On 20 December, 1946, Gardner made the first break into the code, revealing the existence of Soviet espionage in the Manhattan Project. Duncan Lee, Donald Wheeler, Jane Foster Zlatowski, and Maurice Halperin passed information to Moscow. The first messages to be partially decoded were full of gaps and were unintelligible. Those who criticized the governmental and non-governmental efforts to root out and expose communists felt that these efforts were an overreaction (in addition to other reservations about McCarthyism). FBI's Alan Belmont considered that, although decryption might corroborate the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley and enable successful prosecution of such suspects as Judith Coplon and the Perlo and Silvermaster groups, a careful study of all factors compelled the conclusion it would not be in the best interests of prosecutors, defendants, and the United States to use Venona project information for prosecution.[12][13][14]. Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, concerned about the White House's history of leaking sensitive information, decided to deny President Truman direct knowledge of the project. "[33] (In the decrypted documents issued from the National Security Agency, "VENONA" is written in capitals, but lowercasing is common in modern journalism.) fa:پروژه ونونا When used correctly, one-time pad encryption is unbreakable. By early 1951, Philby knew that US intelligence would soon also conclude that Maclean was the sender, and he advised that Maclean be recalled. The president received the substance of the material only through the FBI, Justice Department and CIA reports on counterintelligence and intelligence matters. [citation needed] However, the Russians were not aware of this base even as late as 1950. According to the Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, the complicity of both Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White is conclusively proven by Venona, [31][32]stating "The complicity of Alger Hiss of the State Department seems settled. Senior army officers, in consultation with the FBI and CIA, made the decision to restrict knowledge of Venona within the government (even the CIA was not made an active partner until 1952). President Roosevelt, for example, was called "Kapitan" (Captain), and Los Alamos the "Reservation." he:מסמכי וינונה ru:Проект «Венона» The Soviet systems in general used a code to convert words and letters into numbers, to which additive keys (from one-time pads) were added, encrypting the content. Somebody who was working for the manufacturers of Soviet secret-communication materials had reused pages of some of the one-time pads in other pads, which were then used for other secret messages. However, due to a serious blunder on the part of the Soviets, some of this traffic was vulnerable to cryptanalysis. London, Summer 1998, pp. The Venona project was a long-running secret collaboration of the United States and United Kingdom intelligence agencies involving cryptanalysis of messages sent by intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union, the majority during World War II. Generating the one-time pads was a slow and labor-intensive process, and the outbreak of war with Germany in June 1941 caused a sudden increase in the need for coded messages. Commenting on the list of 349 Americans identified by Venona, published in an appendix to Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, Navasky wrote, "The reader is left with the implication — unfair and unproven — that every name on the list was involved in espionage, and as a result, otherwise careful historians and mainstream journalists now routinely refer to Venona as proof that many hundreds of Americans were part of the red spy network. Approximately 2,200 of the messages were decrypted and translated; about half for the 1943 GRU-Naval Washington to Moscow messages were broken, but none for any other year, although several thousand were sent between 1941 and 1945. Although unknown to the public, and even to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, these programs were of importance concerning crucial events of the early Cold War. The evidence had inherent weaknesses: Belmont discussed the risks of making assumptions: Belmont discussed the problem of linking a code name with an actual name: FBI Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont offered a example of "the tentative nature of many identifications" "concerning an individual with the cover name 'Antenna.'[12][13]. [35], When Kim Philby learned of Venona in 1949, he obtained advance warning that his fellow Soviet spies Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess were in danger of being exposed. nl:Project Venona "[44], Writing about Alger Hiss, Hiss's lawyer John Lowenthal criticized the accuracy and methodology of the Venona analysts, charging they employed false premises and flawed comparative logic to reach the desired conclusion Alger Hiss was the spy "Ales." In some cases, notably that of Alger Hiss, the matching of a Venona code name to an individual is disputed. The Venona evidence indicates that it was unidentified sources codenamed "Quantum" and "Pers" who facilitated transfer of nuclear weapons technology to the Soviet Union from positions within the Manhattan Project. However, several current authors, researchers, and archivists consider the Venona evidence on Hiss to be inconclusive[34] or incorrect. "The Venona Papers". One significant aid (mentioned by the NSA) in the early stages may have been work done in cooperation between the Japanese and Finnish cryptanalysis organizations; when the Americans broke into Japanese codes during World War II, they gained access to this information. It is probable that the Soviet code generators started duplicating cipher pages in order to keep up with demand. Navasky claims the Venona material is being used to “distort … our understanding of the cold war” and that the files are potential “time bombs of misinformation.”[4]